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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT LEE GRAY, the Natural
Father of David Allen Gray,
aka John Gray, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.
14355

vs.
GALVESTON SONNY SCOTT, BEEHIVE
LODGE OF ELKS #407,
I.B.P.O.E.W., et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant to
recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of David Allen Gray,
aka John Gray.

David Allen Gray and Galveston Sonny Scott were

involved in argument and mutual combat over several days in several
places.

On New Year's Eve, 1973-1974, their final battle occurred

at the Beehive Lodge of Elks1 New Year's Eve Ball, resulting in the
death of David Gray.

The Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that the

Beehive Lodge of Elks was negligent in failing to protect Gray from
this shooting.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable G. Hal
Taylor, Third Judicial District Court Judge.

The jury returned a

verdict in favor of the Beehive Lodge of Elks and against the
Plaintiff, "no cause of action."
The same jury returned a verdict against Galveston Sonny
Scott, a defendant who is not a party to the appeal, for damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Beehive Lodge of Elks requests this Court to affirm
the judgment and jury verdict of the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant's Statement of Facts is not accurate and misrepresents the facts material to this appeal.

Therefore, Respondent

must submit the following Statement of Facts.
On December 31, 1973, the Beehive Lodge of Elks held its
annual New Year's Eve Ball at its Lodge at 248 West South Temple,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

It was a dress affair, open only to Lodge

members who had reservations, and their wives and guests.
the people present were members.

[R. 522, 880]

knew over 90 per cent of the people present.

Most of

The Lodge officers

[R. 884, 901]

As the party was coming to an end and the band playing its
last number, [R. 512] one Galveston Sonny Scott barged into the Elks
Lodge, without authorization, and without stopping at the reservation
desk, and proceeded toward the rear of the Lodge where a shooting
occurred between himself and David Gray, also known as "Goofoo."

-2-
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Also involved in the shooting were Scott's friend, Binky Coleman,
and GrayTs friend, "Blood."
dead.

When the shooting was over, Gray was

None of the participants in the shooting was a member of the

Elks Lodge.

[R. 521, 522]

The party had been peaceful, without

problems of any kind, until this incident.

[R. 280, 298-299, 324,

354, 378, 395, 398, 431, 466, 522, 848, 854, 901]
The shooting, itself, culminated an argument between Scott
and Gray that had existed for several days.

[R. 561-567]

This

argument had seen earlier shooting between these same two individuals
the same evening on West Second South Street [R. 565, 566] and in
front of Gray's home, [R. 566, 588, 754, 761] and two days before
on South Temple Street.

[R. 564]

Neither the officers nor members

of the Lodge were aware that these two men had been involved in
these shooting incidents until after the shooting on New Year's Eve.
[R. 363, 397, 422, 849, 889, 919]
The argument between Gray and Scott concerned a woman named
Hortensia Williams.
jewelry from him.

[R. 560]
[R. 780]

Gray claimed Miss Williams had stolen

Miss Williams denied this and claimed

Gray had given her the jewelry if she would be his prostitute and work
the streets for him.

[R. 788-789]

the jewelry to Sonny Scott.
[R. 560, 576]

She refused to do so, and gave

[R. 560, 574]

Scott sold the rings.

Several days before any of the shooting, Gray called

by Scott's house, wherein Miss Williams and the jewelry were discussed.
[R. 560-561]

When Gray left Scott's house, Scott's brother entered

and informed him that Gray and Blood were outside with guns.
However, apparently no shooting occurred at that time.
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[R. 561]

On Saturday, December 29, 1973, Miss Williams was at the
Elks Lodge where the regular Saturday night dance was in session.
Scott was also present.

Gray, with two lady friends, arrived and

commenced to argue with Miss Williams.
struck Miss Williams.

[R. 562, 563]

[R. 563, 732, 782]

exchanged two or three blows.

[R. 563]

Then, Gray

Scott intervened, and they

The manager of the Lodge

stopped the fight, and told the participants to leave the Lodge.
397]

The fight lasted no more than 10 to 15 seconds.

[R.

[R. 737]

Scott testified it was no big thing [R. 579] and only two or three
blows were exchanged.

[R. 563, 579]

The Lodge manager did not know any of the participants in
the fight, nor did he write down their names.

[R. 396, 402]

did not consider the fight a serious problem.

[R. 400]

He

After Gray left the Lodge, Scott's sister came in and told
Scott that Gray had gone to get a gun.
friend

out to bring him a gun.

friend brought him a gun.

[R. 563]

[R. 579]

[R. 580]

Scott sent a

Twenty minutes later, Scott's

Within two minutes after re-

ceiving the gun, Scott left the Elks Lodge by the back door.
580-581]

[R. 563,

Scott1s friend, Middleton, was with him at the time.

Neither the manager, the band leader, nor anyone connected
with the Lodge had any knowledge of the foregoing.
seen nor heard the talk of guns at any time.
768-769, 777, 786]

They had not

[R. 363, 401, 580,

Even Middleton, Scottfs friend, did not know

Scott had a gun until they were going out the back door of the Lodge,
at which time he saw it for the first time.

[R. 738, 746, 768]

By the time Scott and Middleton left the Lodge, the Lodge
had closed.

It had closed a few minutes early because it had been
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a slow night and it was close to closing time.

[R. 397-398]

The

band leader felt the dance closed a little early because of the
earlier argument, but he further stated it was close to closing
time anyway*

[R. 365, 368]

In any case, the dance was over and

the Lodge closed when Scott left by the rear door.

Gray, by this

time, had been gone from the Lodge 20 to 30 minutes.

[R. 536]

Scott walked around the building to South Temple Street,
where his car was parked.

He saw Gray and Blood attempting to enter

the front door of the Lodge.
door was locked.

[R. 564, 581]

[R. 564, 581]

Then, Gray and Blood went to a

nearby alley and started shooting at Scott.
the fire.

However, the Lodge

[R. 581]

They exchanged several shots and departed.

Apparently no one was hit by gunfire at that time.

Scott returned
[R. 564]

This shooting

occurred in the street and alley near the Elks Lodge.

[R. 564]

The alley serves many businesses along South Temple, including the
Utah Bar, a nearby cafe, and the Utah State Liquor Store.

[R. 403-404]

At the time Gray and Scott were shooting at each other in
the street and alley, the Lodge manager was inside the Lodge and did
not hear any gunshots.

[R. 394, 397]

The band leader was also still

inside the Lodge, waiting to be paid, and he did not hear any gunshots.

[R. 364, 367-368]

Hortensia Williams testified that she was

in the ladies1 restroom and did hear shots.

[R. 789-790]

She did

not, however, know where the shots came from nor who was involved,
nor when they occurred in relationship to the earlier argument.
[R. 787, 789]

The restroom is situated in that part of the Lodge

next to the alley where the shooting occurred.

[Ex. 1-P]

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The band leader did not know about the shooting until after
he left the Lodge and was so informed outside,
were investigating the matter at that time.

[R. 363]

[R. 364]

The police

The band

leader did not know who was involved in that shooting incident.
[R. 367-368]
The manager of the Lodge did not hear about the shooting
until some unknown person entered the Lodge and informed him there
had been a shooting out in the alley.

[R. 399]

to 30 minutes after Gray and Scott had left.

This occurred 20

[R. 397, 399]

The

manager did not investigate the shooting in the alley, and did not
know who was involved.
said incident.

[R. 397, 400]

The police investigated the

[R. 364]

Two days later, on New Year!s Eve, December 31, 1973, Scott
and Gray shot at one another again on several occasions.

Scott

drove down to West Second South Street, in Salt Lake City, and saw
Gray and Blood standing on the street.

[R. 565, 584]

Scott shot

three times at them and yelled that they were going to have it out
that night.

[R. 566, 586]

Gray shot back at Scott.

Scott left to obtain more ammunition.
he went to Grayfs house.
changed gunfire.

[R. 566]

[R. 585, 735]

Then, with Mr. Middleton,

There, Scott and Gray again ex-

[R. 566, 587-588, 735]

No one connected with the Elks Lodge was aware that this
shooting was going on between Scott and Gray on New Yearfs Eve.
Nor was anyone connected with the Elks Lodge aware that Scott and
Gray had shot at each other outside of the Elks Lodge on the previous
Saturday.

[R. 363, 397, 401, 422, 889, 911-912, 919]
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Scott then went to the 13th Floor of the Travelodge, where
he spent the rest of the evening celebrating New Year's Eve.
Afterward, he and Middleton drove to the Elks Lodge.

[R. 568]

[R. 568]

As

they pulled up in front of the Lodge, Scott's sister approached him
and told him that Gray was inside.

[R. 569]

Scott took a pistol

from the glove compartment, stuck it in his belt, [R. 595] and told
Middleton to park the car across the street.

[R. 595, 766]

At this time, the Elks celebration was almost over, and the
last dance had been announced.
band was playing the last tune.
leaving for some time.

[R. 512, 538, 910-911, 912]
[R. 512, 538]

[R. 538, 901, 912-913]

The

People had been
Until this time,

the Elks Lodge celebration had been peaceful, without incident.
Every single witness, including all of plaintiff's witnesses, testified that the Elks' New Year's Eve party had been peaceful, without
fights or problems.
such.

No one had seen guns or heard the mention of

No one noticed anything to suggest there would be trouble.

[R. 280, 298-299, 324, 354, 378, 395, 398, 431, 466, 522, 848, 854,
901]
Scott then entered the Elks Lodge.
ization.

He entered without author-

[R. 535A (page unnumbered in transcript), 538, 553]

Scott

did not stop at the reservation desk, but, rather, barged past the
desk and its attendant, Floyd Atkins.
Scott enter, but could not stop him.

[R. 596]

Floyd Atkins saw

[R. 924, 926]

Scott testified that as he entered the Lodge, his gun was
in his coat.

[R. 603]

One of his friends saw him and grabbed him;

however, his friend then saw the gun in his coat and let him go.
[R. 569]

No one else present saw this incident between Scott and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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his friend.

The band leader, who was situated near the front

door on the bandstand, did not see the incident.

[R. 354-355,

360-361]
Scott went toward the rear of the Lodge [R. 570] (some witnesses say he ran toward the rear [R. 285]) when he heard gunshots
coming from where Gray was standing.
Grayfs hand.

[R. 570, 602]

gun and fired back.

He also saw flashes from

Scott testified he took out his own

[R. 570, 602-603]

The band leader testified

that the first shots were fired from the rear to the front.
357]

Some witnesses say Gray fired first.

witnesses indicated Scott fired first.

[R. 792, 831]

[R. 460]

[R. 340,

Other

Scott saw Gray go

down, and he and his friend then backed out of the Lodge, firing
their guns all the way.

[R. 571]

The shooting occurred very quickly and without warning.
466, 848]

[R,

Sylvester Jones, a member of the Lodge, testified that

it all happened so quickly there was nothing anyone could do to
prevent it.

[R. 466, 472-473]

(Jones was, incidentally, a trained

security guard employed at the Salt Lake International Airport
[R. 469] but not acting as such at the Elks Lodge.)

He testified

that even if he had been on duty as a security guard, he could not
have prevented this shooting.

[R. 472-473]

Other Lodge officers

testified that it all happened so quickly that nothing could be
done.

[R. 437]

The doorman said that Scott did not stop at the

desk, but went right into the Lodge, and people started running out.
[R. 924]

Scott's friend, Middleton, testified that he let Scott

out of the car in front of the Lodge, and merely made a U-turn to
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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park on the other side of the street and had not yet parked, when
he heard the shooting.

[R. 766]

Two of plaintiff's witnesses testified that there was nothing
to indicate that a problem of any kind was going to occur until
someone yelled, ffMy God, he's got a gun," and then the shooting
started.

[R. 285, 324-325, 380]

Even then, one of plaintiff's

witnesses thought the shots were New Year's Eve poppers and not
gunshots.

[R. 324]

Witnesses testified that after the shooting, they saw Blood
go through Gray's clothing and remove something from his person.
[R. 304, 326, 842-843]
what was removed.

Some of the witnesses could not identify

[R. 304, 326]

remove a gun from Gray's body.

One witness, however, saw Blood
[R. 793]

The police arrived and investigated.

The police found 13

live reloaded bullets and two empty bullet casings in Gray's pocket.
They also found a Beehive membership card, but could not recall
whose name was upon it, if anyone's.

[R. 725-727]

(The police

officer was instructed by the Court to retrieve this card from the
police evidence room and return it to Court.
the officer did not return to Court.

[R. 728]

However,

Appellant's attorney informed

the Court that the officer had advised him that the card was not
there.

[R. 944])
Until the shooting, the Elks Lodge celebration had been

peaceful.

Except for a minor argument between two girls ten minutes

earlier, [R. 339-340] every single witness, including those witnesses
called by the plaintiff, testified that the party was peaceful,
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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without any trouble of any kind, the entire night.

[R. 280, 298-

299, 324, 354, 378, 395, 398, 431, 466, 522, 848, 854, 901]

4

The

party had commenced at 10:00 p.m., and the shooting occurred at
1:50 a.m., nearly four hours later, at closing time.

None of the
i

witnesses, during the course of the evening, had seen any guns.
[R. 325-326, 431, 850]
Contrary to the claim of the Appellant in his Statement of
Facts, the argument ten minutes earlier, between the two girls,
had no connection with the later shooting.

[R. 339]

I

That argument

was solved by the band leader informing the girls that the party
had been very peaceful, and for them to take their problem outside.

<

That was ten minutes before Scott even arrived or the shooting in
question occurred.

[R. 339-340]

All witnesses testified the

shooting occurred quickly, without warning.

[R. 466, 472-473, 766,

848]
The Elks New Year's Eve party was not open to the public.
[R. 539, 855, 882-883, 905-907]

Only members with reservations,

and their wives and guests, were allowed.

[R. 538, 855, 901]

members of the Lodge could make reservations.
public was not allowed.

[R. 539]

reservations were not allowed.

[R. 538-539]

Only

The

Even members who did not have

[R. 539, 907]

The Lodge officers

knew more than 90 per cent of the people there.
A close check was made of reservations.

[R. 884, 901]

[R. 549, 906]

Hands were

stamped to allow re-entrance into the Lodge in the event one had to
leave.

[R. 278, 379, 924, 926]

The front reservation desk was

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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{

manned during the entire night, including the time when Scott
entered the Lodge.

[R. 907, 910, 916, 923, 924-925]

The lighting in the Lodge consisted of bright lights and
dim lights.

The bright lights were off at times, leaving only the

dim lights for atmosphere.
lights was by the band.

[R. 281, 304, 336]

The switch to the

The band leader had standing instructions

to turn the bright lights on if any problem arose.

[R. 336, 517]

At the time of the shooting, the bright lights were off, but the
dim lights were on.
off.

[R. 336]

[R. 304, 837]

The lights were never completely

One witness who testified that the lights were "off"

later testified that she meant the "bright lights were off."
304]

[R. 281,

At the time of the shooting, while the lights were dim, the

band leader was still able to see the entire length of the Lodge
and identify those at the other end.

[R. 355-356.]

The rear door of the Lodge was not locked.

It was in use

all evening by the ladies working in the kitchen, where the door
was located.

The door can always be opened from the inside by merely

pushing on the bar.

[R. 848, 854]

The only persons in attendance at the Elks Lodge on New
Year's Eve who had knowledge of the prior problems between Scott
and Gray, as well as the prior shootings, were Gray, himself, and
his friend, Blood.

[R. 397, 889, 919]

Not one person connected

with the Lodge had any knowledge of the shooting between Scott and
Gray in the alley outside the Elks Lodge on Saturday night, or on
West Second South early on New Year's Eve, or in front of Gray's
house on New Year's Eve.

[R. 299, 363, 397, 422, 889, 911-912, 919]
-11-
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The Elks Lodge did not hire any armed, uniformed security
guards for the New Year's Eve Ball.

The officers and members did

not feel that security was a problem.

[R. 500, 504, 912]

The Elks

Lodge had never experienced a shooting, knifing, or serious fight
at any of its special functions in all of the years of its existence.
[R. 481, 524, 846, 853-854, 857-858, 860-862, 886, 890-891, 912]
One of plaintiff's witnesses testified she had been going to Elks
Lodge functions for over twenty years, and the Elks Lodge was considered one of the better places to go.

[R. 298-299]

One elderly

lady member testified that she was proud that she could feel as
safe at the Lodge as she did in her own living room.

[R. 846]

Nathaniel Johnson, a well-educated chemist and Army Reserve Colonel
[R. 556, 902-903] and chairman of the New Year's Eve Ball, said that
there was no need for security guards.

[R. 543]

All members of the Lodge had responsibility for maintaining
peace and order among Lodge members.

[R. 413, 503, 515]

The Antler

Guard, a ceremonial office, also had official responsibility for
keeping order and peace among the members at official functions;
however, the Antler Guard is not a security guard.
547, 554-555, 892]

[R. 428-430,

He would not be expected to stop serious fights

or gunfights if they were to occur.

[R. 408]

The Appellant attempts to make a point that Anderson Pearson
was a security guard and was downstairs at the time of the shooting.
However, Anderson Pearson was not a security guard, but was the
Antler Guard, and, he went downstairs at the end of the party to
eat,

[R. 413]

Anderson Pearson testified that he was supposed to
-12-
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receive further training following a discussion with James Dooley,
the leader of the Lodge.

[R. 410]

James Dooley testified he recalled

no discussion with Pearson as to training as a security guard, but
stated there may have been a conversation concerning karate lessons.
[R. 885]

A karate expert had given a demonstration at the Elks

Lodge, and many of the members, including Anderson Pearson, were
interested in taking lessons.
in the lessons.

[R. 885]

Pearson never participated

In any case, Anderson Pearson testified that in

all of his experience with the Elks Lodge, he had never experienced
a serious fight, shooting, or knifing at the Elks Lodge.
429]

[R. 427-428,

He further testified he had never experienced a fight or an

argument that he did not feel capable of handling and was not
personally able to handle and solve.

[R. 429-430]

The Beehive Lodge of Elks is not just another private club.
The Elks Lodge has been organized in the Salt Lake Valley for fifty
years.

[Ex. 28-D]

Most of its members are middle aged or older.

The oldest member is 73 years of age, and the average age is 54.6 years
[Ex. 30-D, Roster of Members]

(As of the date of the incident.)

Its many committees are organized for the purpose of giving scholarships, helping the needy, special celebrations for Mother's Day,
Father's Day, Labor Day, providing family outings, a children's
Christmas party, churchgoing activities, as well as the annual New
Year's Eve Ball.

[R. 860-861, 871-879; Ex. 27-D]

In addition, the Elks Lodge maintains its Lodge open for its
members seven days a week, wherein members with guests are welcome
for lunch, dinner, dancing, drinks, card playing, and socializing.
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[R. 524-525, 880]

Whereas the Elks Lodge has never experienced any

problems or fights at any of its special functions, [R. 481, 524]

4

it may have an occasional argument or fight during its regular hours.
The leader of the Lodge, James Dooley, testified that the Lodge
may have five or six fracases a year, but that these fracases are

I

not serious, but more like family arguments, [R. 481, 524] and are
solved by the Lodge members without the necessity of outside help.
[R. 887]

Other officers confirmed that the only problems they had

I

experienced were minor problems that were solved by the Lodge. [R. 891]
The only exception to the foregoing occurred approximately
three months prior to the New Yearfs Eve Ball in question, when,

<

during a weekday card game, one card player shot another in the leg.
[R. 486]

This occurred during the week and not at any special

function of the Lodge.

[R. 525]

Mr. Dooley was present in the

Lodge at that time, but did not see the shooting or the events leading
up to it.
police.

He merely heard the shots, [R. 525-526] and called the
[R. 486]

The two card players were banned forever from

the Lodge, and have never returned.
Book.]

[R. 487, 887, Ex. 30-D, Minute

James Dooley's first knowledge of that shooting was as it

occurred and not beforehand, as stated by AppellantTs Brief. [R.
485-486]
The official Minute Book of the Elks Lodge [Ex. 30-D] shows
no other such incidents, nor any fights of any kind, for the one
year period prior to the New Year's Eve in question.

-14-
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[Ex. 30-D]

{

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 36.
The principal question of fact for jury determination was
whether or not the Beehive Lodge of Elks exercised reasonable and
ordinary care, under the circumstances, in regard to its members and
their guests during the New Year's Eve Ball.
The testimony shows that Scott and Gray were involved in
argument and mutual combat for several days.

They had shot at each

other on three different occasions, in three different locations,
during the two days prior to the night in question.
The testimony clearly shows that not one single officer or
member of the Elks Lodge, nor the band leader, had any knowledge of
the prior shooting episodes between these two men.
424, 891, 919]

[R. 363, 397,

The closest the Lodge ever came to the difficulty

between Scott and Gray was on Saturday, two days before, when the
two men argued inside the Lodge and exchanged two or three blows.
At that time, they were told by the Lodge manager to leave.

[R. 397]

That fight was not considered serious by either the manager or by
Scott.

[R. 400, 579]

The manager did not know the identity of

Scott or Gray, nor did he take down their names.

[R. 396, 402]

The manager did not see guns nor hear talk of guns.

[R. 401]

The

manager did not hear the shooting which occurred 20 to 30 minutes
later, outside of the Lodge in the alley or street.

[R. 394, 397]

He merely was told by someone else that a shooting had occurred, but
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he did not know who was involved in that shooting.

[R. 397, 399]

The band leader did not hear the shooting outside, but only heard
about it later from others.

[R. 363, 367-368]

4

He did not know the -

identity of the persons involved in that shooting.

[R. 363]

Hor-

tensia Williams was still in the Lodge in the restroom (located next

4

to the alley where the shooting allegedly occurred) and claimed
she heard some gunshots, but she also did not know where the shots
came from or who was involved in that shooting.

[R. 787-789]

i

There was nothing whatsoever about the Scott-Gray argument
on Saturday night to suggest to anyone connected with the Lodge
that these same two men would shoot at each other at any other time,

*

and certainly nothing to suggest in any way that at the formal New
Year's Eve Ball, attended only by members and guests with reservations,
Scott would burst in at the end of the party and shoot Gray, or, for
that matter, that any shooting of any kind would occur.
The Elks Club had never in its history experienced a fight,
or shooting, or violence of any kind at any special function, such
as the New Year's Eve Ball.

All prior special functions of the

Lodge, including the New Year's Eve Balls in prior years, had
always been peaceful.
886, 890-891, 912]

[R. 481, 524, 846, 853-854, 857-858, 860-862,

The New Year's Eve Ball in question was peaceful,

without problems of any kind, until the shooting occurred during
the closing band number.

[R. 280, 298-299, 324, 354, 378, 395, 398,

431, 466, 522, 848, 854, 901]

Fights or arguments occasionally

occur at the Lodge at other times, but such have never been serious
enough to call the police.

The only exception was one shooting three
-16-
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months earlier between two card players.

However, the police

were called and those two card players were banned by the Lodge
forever and have never been seen since.
The Respondent believes it was entitled to a Dismissal at
the end of the plaintiff's case, and certainly to a Directed Verdict
at the end of the evidence.

Its motions were denied.

In 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence, Sec. 63, it is stated under
the general heading "Duty to Anticipate Criminal Acts" as follows:
No person owes a duty to anyone to anticipate
that a crime will be committed by another, and
to act upon that belief. It has been held that
no one, under ordinary circumstances, is chargeable
with damages because he has not anticipated a
crime by some third person. However, a duty to
afford protection of another from a criminal
assault or wilful act of violence of a third
person may arise, at least under some circumstances,
if that duty is voluntarily assumed, such as by
contract.
In Popovich v. Pechkurow, 145 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio, 1956) a patron
sued a tavern for injuries sustained when he was shot by another
patron.

He claimed the tavern owners were negligent in failing to

call the police after being warned of the patron's intention to
get a rifle.

A directed verdict in favor of the tavern owner was

affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio.

In that case, the assaulter

left the tavern, informing everyone he was going to get his gun,
and come back and shoot everyone in the tavern.

In about fifteen

minutes, he returned with his gun and, while standing outside the
door, fired several shots through the glass panel.

The Supreme

Court, in affirming the directed verdict, stated:
The general rule is that when, between negligence
and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a wilful, malicious, and criminal act of
a third person which causes the injury but
was not intended by the negligent person
and could not have been foreseen by him,
the causal chain between the negligence and
the accident is broken. . .
Wrongful acts of independent third persons,
not actually intended by the defendant, are
not regarded by the law as natural consequences
of his wrong, and he is not bound to anticipate
the general probability of such acts, any
more than a particular act by this or that
individual. This rule applies a fortiori
to criminal acts.
In Rosensteil v. Lisdas, 456 P.2d 61 (Ore. 1969) a restaurant
patron was shot and injured by persons who had come in from the
street to continue their fight.

The police testified there had been

|

4

I

*

a previous violent altercation between the same individuals in the
same restaurant a year before.

They also testified they were called

to the restaurant on numerous occasions for different drunks and
fights.

Also, a waitress testified that during the thirteen days

she had worked immediately prior to the night in question, there
had been "a few hassles.M

In finding in favor of the owner of the

restaurant, the Oregon Supreme Court stated the following:
Even if a restaurant owner has the duty under
some circumstances to employ personnel who
are capable of keeping order and thus protect
his patrons from injury resulting from the
foreseeable conduct of his patrons, he is not
required to employ such personnel for the contingency that outsiders will elect to use the
restaurant rather than the street as their
battleground. The fact that the Hale brothers
had previously been in the restaurant gave
defendants1 employees no warning that they
would stir up trouble and suddenly return to
burst into the restaurant. It is the responsibility of the public police to quell such
-18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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disturbances whether they occur on the street
or in a restaurant. And even where previously
violence has swept in from the streets, we do
not think that it should be the duty of a
businessman operating a restaurant to risk
his own life or employ others to risk theirs
in order to protect bystanders who happen to
be in the restaurant rather than on the street.
That is a function which he should be able
to leave to government police.
The Court concluded:
The fact that previous disturbances had occurred
in the restaurant would not impose upon defendants the duty to prepare against disturbances
which originated in conflict elsewhere and
which result in harm to defendant's patrons
simply because the victim without any warning
to defendants chose to use defendants' restaurant
as a place of refuge.
In Stevenson v. Kansas City, 187 Kan. 705, 360 P.2d 1 (1961)
a patron at a wrestling exhibition was assaulted and injured by
a man who robbed her on the premises.

The plaintiff calimed that

the defendants failed to provide her with a safe place to attend
the performance and further failed to provide sufficient police or
guards.
The Court, in finding in favor of the defendants who were
conducting the wrestling match, stated in quoting 65 C.J.S., Negligence, Sec. Ill, as follows:
Defendant's negligence is too remote to
constitute the proximate cause where an independent illegal willful, malicious, or criminal
act of a third person, which could not reasonably have been foreseen, and without which
such injury would not have been sustained,
intervenes. A person is not bound to anticipate
the malicious, wilful, or criminal acts of
others by which damage is inflicted. . .
The Court continued in citing from one of its earlier decisions:
-19-
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We all anticipate pocket picking when the
circus comes, and housebreaking during fair
week, but the circus and the fair are not
the causes of such crimes. We know, too,
that should a housebreaker be discovered in
the act of committing burglary, he might do
violence to a person interrupting his
depredation. But if, knowing the city to
be infested with such characters, we go out
for the evening leaving the back door unlocked
and leaving a servant in the house, omission
to lock the door is not the cause of the
burglary, should one occur, or the cause
of injury to the servant who tries to intercept commission of the crime. The cause of
injury originates with the burglar, whose
entrance into the house was not obstructed
by a locked door.
The Court continued, at page 6:

4

4

4

By its own contents and allegations, plaintiff's petition charges defendants with a
degree of negligence that would tend to make
them her insurers from the time she entered
the Memorial Building until she departed
therefrom, but no such duty is placed on
the defendants when this case is tested by
the foregoing authorities in our jurisdiction.
To apply such a high degree of vigilance would
make a public amusement impossible because
of the expense of guards, time for searching
customers to discover possible weapons, etc.
To foresee that plaintiff while attending
the wrestling matches would be assaulted at
the hour of 11:00 p.m. at the particular spot
on the particular ramp on the way to the
particular rest room in the Memorial Building
in Kansas City would indeed require imaginative
foresight and such is not tye type of foreseeability required under our law. Only the
standard of the reasonable and prudent man,
as set out above, is required.
In Strong v. Granite Furniture Co., 77 Utah 292, 294 P. 303
(1930) the plaintiff purchased furniture from the defendant and had
it in possession in his home.

He failed to make payments.
-20-
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While

.

(

i

he was out of town, the furniture store entered his home and
repossessed their furniture.

Later, thieves entered the same

home and removed the rest of the plaintiff's personal property.
Plaintiff sued the furniture store for the loss to the thieves,
claiming the furniture store knew the plaintiff was out of town,
and yet, left a window unsecured.

The Court stated:

Assuming that upon this evidence the jury
was justified in finding that the defendant's
agents removed the nails which were driven
into the window frame to prevent the window
from being raised, and that such nails were
not replaced, can it be said that such acts
constitute the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' losing their household goods?
Generally speaking, TTthe proximate cause of
an injury is the primary moving cause without
which it would not have been inflicted, but
which, in the natural and probable sequence
of events, and without the intervention of
any new or independent cause,%produces the
injury . . ."
The Court in the above case then stated the applicable law
as found in Corpus Juris, as follows:
Defendant's negligence is too remote to
constitute the proximate cause where an independent illegal act of a third person, which
could not reasonably have been foreseen, and
without which such injury would not have been
sustained, intervenes. A person is not bound
to anticipate the malicious or criminal acts
of others by which damage is inflicted, even
though they are the acts of children. But
where an independent illegal act was of a
nature which might have been anticipated, and
which it was the defendant's duty to provide
against, he will be liable for a breach of
such duty, notwithstanding the production
of injuries by the intervention of an act
of the character described.
The Supreme Court, testing the above rule, stated:
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Tested by the rule of law just quoted, it
cannot be said that the leaving of nails
out of the window frame in plaintiffs' dwelling
was the proximate cause, or a proximate contributing cause, of the loss of plaintiffs1
household goods. Obviously, the leaving of
the window in plaintiffs1 home unfastened did
not produce the injury complained of. The
proximate cause of plaintiffs' loss was the
felonious acts of the unknown person.
It is argued that the negligence of the
defendant was the proximate cause or a proximate
contributing cause of the loss, because, except
for its negligence, plaintiffs' dwelling would
not have been invaded. This is pure speculation.
Burglars are not necessarily deterred from
entering unoccupied houses merely because the
windows cannot be raised. There is no evidence
which shows, or tends to show, that the
unknown person or persons who removed plaintiffs'
household goods gained entrance to plaintiffs'
dwelling by raising the window, or that the
window was unfastened when the unknown person
or persons entered, or that they would not
have entered if the window had been fastened.
The evidence in this case is insufficient to
support a finding that any act of the defendant
was the proximate cause or a proximate contributing cause of the loss of plaintiffs' household goods.

(

|

i

i

'

In Huddleston v. Clark, 186 Kan. 209, 349 P.2d 888 (Kan. 1960) *
a patron was shot in a public tavern by a neighboring businessman.
The businessman had been refused service and had told the waitress
he was going to return and shoot her.
same statement many times before.

This same man had made that

He was escorted out of the business

and the owner told him to stay out, wherein the man threatened to
get a gun and return and "shoot the place up."
and during the shooting injured a patron.
defendants' demurrer.

He did return,

The Trial Court sustained

The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed, stating:
-22-
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While he sometimes spoke in a loud voice and
used profane language toward defendants'
employees when they refused to sell him beer,
he had never previously harmed anyone in
defendants' place of business. It was not
shown, under the evidence as presented, that
when Donohue was ordered to and did leave
defendants' premises earlier in the afternoon
of the day in question, either defendants or
their employees believed there was a reasonable
probability he would return with a gun and
would almost immediately upon re-entering the
establishment, commit an assault on one or
more of the customers by his promiscuous shooting.
Most of the above cases concern the duty of public places
of entertainment.

But in our case, we have a private lodge.

The

above cited law would be even more applicable in our case.
While the Court agreed there was no evidence that the Lodge
had any reason to anticipate that a shooting would occur on New
Year's Eve, the Court felt that a question of fact did exist as to
whether or not the Lodge exercised reasonable and ordinary care
under the circumstances in regard to its members and their guests
at the New Year's Eve Ball.
case to the jury.

Therefore, the Court submitted the

Among the instructions were the following, which

we set forth verbatim for the convenience of the Court:
Instruction No. 10
The terms "ordinary", and "proximate cause",
as used in these instructions are defined as
follows:
A. "Ordinary care" is that degree of care which
a reasonably prudent person would use under the
same or similar circumstances • T?y0rdinary care"
implies the exercise of reasonable diligence and
such watchfulness, caution and foresight as under
all the circumstances of the particular case
would be exercised by a reasonably careful,
prudent person:
-23-
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B. By "proximate cause11 is meant that cause
which in a natural, continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury
and without which the injury would not have
occurred. (Emphasis added)
Instruction No. 15
As used in these instructions, the term "negligence" means the failure to do what a reasonable
and prudent person would have done under the
circumstances involved, or doing what a reasonable
and prudent person would not have done under such
circumstances. The faulty conduct may lie either
in acting or in not acting. The standard oT
contuct required in any given case is dictated
and measured by the immediate requirements of
the occasion as determined from the existing facts
and circumstances. (Emphasis added)
You will note, that the person whose conduct we
set up as a standard is not the extraordinarily
cautious individual, nor the exceptionally skillful
one, but a person of reasonable and ordinary
prudence. While exceptional caution and skill
are to be admired and encouraged, the law does not
demand them under the general standards of conduct.
Instruction No. 27
The conduct of the defendant Beehive Lodge of
Elks and/or the individual defendants who are
officers, agents, or trustees of the said Beehive
Lodge of Elks need not have been the sole cause
of the harm of injury or death sustained by the
decedent David Allen Gray. If you find the said
defendants are negligence and if you further find
that the defendantsy negligence is a proximate
cause of the injuries and death sustained by
the said decedent, the defendants would be liable
for the damages which were caused by the wrongful
death of the decedent; even though the death
was brought about by the concurrent or substantially
simultaneously act or operation of the efforts of
both of the defendants' negligent conduct and
another force or cause such as the conduct of the
defendant Galveston Sonny Scott. (Emphasis added)
Instruction No. 28.
There may be more than one proximate cause of an
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injury or death; and each of the persons whose
conduct did in fact constitute a proximate cause
of the injury or death would be liable for the
said injuries and/or death. (Emphasis added)
Instruction No, 34
You are instructed that in determining one person's
duty to another, foresight, not hindsight, is the
standard by which one's duty of care is to be
judged. The existence of actionable negligence
depends, not upon what actually happened, but upon
what reasonably might have been expected to happen.
Negligence must be determined upon the facts as
they appeared at the time, and not by a judgment
from actual consequences which were not then to
be apprehended by a prudent and competent man.
(Emphasis added)
Instruction No. 35
A person or persons or private club who are
exercising due care have a right to assume that
others will also perform their duties under the
law, and each has a right to rely and act on that
assumption unless, in the exercise of reasonable
care, one observes.or should observe something
to warn one to the contrary. In the absence of
such warning, it is not negligence for a person
to"fail to anticipate, injury or death which can
result only from a violation of law or duty by
another. (Emphasis added)
Instruction No. 36
You are instructed that a private lodge or association., as well as its officers, has no duty to
anyone to anticipate that a crime will be committed
by another person, and to act upon that belief.
It is submitted that based upon the nature and age of the
membership of the Lodge, the Lodge's long trouble-free history, the
exclusiveness and nature of the New Year's Eve Ball, the peacefulness
of the celebration until the end, and the lack of notice or knowledge
of the prior violence between Scott and Gray, the Beehive Lodge of
Elks had no reason, nor duty, to anticipate that there would be a
-25-
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shooting at the Elks Lodge during or at the end of the New Year's

i

Eve Ball,
Therefore, the Court correctly instructed the jury that the
Lodge had no duty to anticipate that this crime would occur.

The

Court correctly instructed the jury that the Lodge had a duty of

*

reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances in behalf of
its members and their guests at the New Year's Eve Ball.

Whether

or not the Lodge exercised reasonable and ordinary care under the
circumstances was a question for the jury, and the jury rendered
its verdict.
Appellant cites as authority Industrial Park Businessmen's
Club, Inc. v. Buck, 479 S.W.2d 842 (1972) as being nvery much in
point."

However, that case is not in point.

The Court stated

therein that the nattackerft had made himself obnoxious to everyone
present for 6 1/2 hours, and despite his conduct, had continuously
been served alcohol, and that the manager of the tavern was drunk
and left the tavern early in disgust at what had been going on, and
that the owner, as well as the manager, knew persons of bad character
were present and around with guns.

None of those facts existed in

the case presently before the bar.

That case has no application.

The only other case cited by Appellant was Samson v. Saginaw
Professional Building, Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843, wherein
the Court stated that the only issues on appeal were (1) the issue
of a landlord's duty to protect one tenant against the mental
patients visiting another tenant, and (2) whether or not probate
-26Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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records of a defendant should have been admitted into evidence.
(P. 846)

Furthermore, the evidence was clear that the landlord

not only knew of the mental patients visiting one tenant, but the
landlord had received specific complaints from tenants over the
problem.

None of these facts, nor equivalent facts, exist in the

case at bar.

That case has no application.

The Appellant, in his Brief, listed 23 "findings of fact"
which he believes the jury was justified in finding from the evidence.
However, most of the 23 findings do not accurately reflect the
evidence.

For this reason, Respondent is compelled to reply to

each of the 23 points as follows:
1.

Appellant states there are several fracases or fights

on the Elks premises each year.

This statement is basically true.

However, the testimony was that these were family type arguments
that were always solved by the Lodge.
2.

[R. 481, 524, 891]

Appellant claims that during the shooting three months

before New Year's Eve, that all the events leading up to the shooting
were done in the presence of James E. Dooley.

This is not true.

Dooley testified that he was upstairs and heard the shooting which
occurred downstairs.

This was the first indication he had of any

trouble between the card players.

[R. 485-486, 525-526]

Dooley

immediately called the police [R. 486] and banned the participants
from the Lodge forever, and they have never returned.
3.

[R. 487, 887]

Appellant states that the shooting was well known to

members of the Lodge.

This is basically true.

The prior shooting

was known to members of the Lodge inasmuch as the two card players
-27-
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were banned forever from the Lodge,
4.

[R. 887, Ex. 30-D, Minutes]

Appellant claims that Dooley asked Pearson, a member of

4

the Antler Guard--"the Lodge's internal security division, to go
for more training to be able to better perform his duties during
the New Year's Eve celebration,"

This is not true.

While Pearson

4

did believe he was supposed to receive more training at the request
of Mr, Dolley, Dooley stated that he did not have such a conversation,
i

but that they may have discussed Pearson's taking karate lessons,
which many of the members were interested in, following a demonstration
at the Lodge.

[R. 885]

Furthermore, there was never any testimony

by Pearson or anyone else in regard to the necessity of security
training for Mthe New Year's Eve celebration,"

*

Furthermore, the

Antler Guard is not the nLodgeTs internal security division."
[R. 428-430, 547, 554-555, 892]
5.

K

<

Appellant claims Pearson had no training to deal with the

"shootings and knifings,11 and for this reason he was being sent for
A

special training.

This is not true.

There was never any discussion

concerning "shootings or knifings" between Pearson and Dooley.
The testimony cited by Appellant does not say what he claims it said.
6.

Appellant states there was a fight less than 48 hours

prior to the New Year's Eve celebration, inside the Beehive Lodge,
involving Scott, Gray, and Blood.

This is basically true, but it

should be pointed out that the manager did not know the identities
of these three individuals involved in the fight.

[R. 396, 402]

Furthermore, he did not know who was involved in the shooting which
occurred outside on the street 20 to 30 minutes later.
-28-
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[R. 397]

I

7.

Appellant claims that when Scott left the Elks Lodge

Saturday night he had a gun "which everyone saw."
false, and a misrepresentation of the evidence.
to the exact opposite.

This is totally

The testimony was

The manager did not see any guns, the band

leader did not see any guns, Hortensia Williams did not see any guns
at any time.

Middleton, Scott's companion, did not see any guns

until Scott was going out the back door.

[R. 363, 401, 500, 768-

769, 777, 786]
8.

The Appellant states that Scott and Gray returned fire

out on the street for "several minutes."

This is not accurate.

The evidence was that Scott and Gray shot at each other, but the
time involved is not known.

Scott testified that after he was shot

at, he returned the fire within 3 second, and then he ran.
9.

[R. 564]

The Appellant states that "several persons inside the

Lodge heard the shooting within two minutes after Scott left."
is not true.

This

The manager and the band leader never did hear the

shooting, but were informed by other persons that there had been a
shooting, after it occurred.

[R. 364, 367-368, 394, 397]

The one

witness who stated the shooting had occurred within two minutes
later corrected her testimony to state she did not know how long
it had occurred after Scott left. [R. 787, 789]
10.

Appellant states that "within a very few minutes after

the shooting" several people ran in to tell Exie Gray that the
shooting had occurred.

Actually, Exie Gray, the manager, testified

he did not hear about the shooting for 15, 20, or 30 minutes after
it had occurred.

[R. 399]
-29-
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11.

Appellant claims that after the Saturday night shootout,

many of the members who left the dance had guns in their belts.

*

This is totally incorrect and a misrepresentation of the facts.
No members were seen with guns on Saturday night.

[R. 768, 769]

The testimony cited by Appellant was that of Scott's companion,

j

Middleton, who testified he saw three or four people out in the
street with guns in their hands.
[R. 744]

He didn't know them.

He never identified them as members of the Lodge as claimed

by Appellant.
12.

[R. 744]

4

[R. 744]

Appellant claims the Saturday night dance stopped early

because of "this fight.ff

This is not accurate.

The manager of

i

the Lodge stated he closed the dance a little early because it was
slow, and anyway, it was close to closing.

[R. 397-398]

The dance

band leader stated he thought the dance closed early because of the

<

earlier fight, but that, in any case, it was close to closing.
[R. 365, 368]
13.

The Appellant claims that Exie Gray, the manager, in-

formed Jim Dooley and Anderson Pearson about the fight.

<

Actually,

Dooley and Pearson didn't hear about the minor fight until after
New Year's Eve.

[R. 488, 889]

None of them had knowledge of the

later shooting out on the street.

[R. 424, 889]

14.

Appellant's statement is basically correct.

15.

Appellant cites the testimony of Nathaniel Johnson as

to what he would have done had he known about the earlier fight on
Saturday.

However, Appellant failed to mention that this testimony

was objected to as being speculative, and that this testimony was
stricken by the trial court.

[R. 921]
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16.

Appellant claims that a fight is a crime.

or may not be true.

This may

A family argument of words is not a crime.

17.

Basically true.

18.

Appellant claims that James Dooley and Shelly Smith

and other members of the Lodge knew that Gray and Scott were on
the premises during both the Saturday night fight and the New Year's
Eve celebration.
facts.

This is not true, but a misrepresentation of the

Scott was not in attendance at the New Year's Eve celebration.

He barged in at the end of the celebration, while the last dance
number was being played.

[R. 535 A, 538, 553, 596, 924, 926]

Dooley did not know Gray, but was introduced to him earlier in the
evening.

Dooley did not know that Gray or Scott had been at the

Lodge on Saturday night until he was so informed by the manager,
after the New Year's Eve celebration.
19.

[R. 889]

Appellant claims that the New Year's Eve committee knew

that Galveston Sonny Scott was on the premises during the New Year's
Eve celebration.
facts.

This is not true and a misrepresentation of the

Galveston Sonny Scott was not present during the New Year's

Eve celebration.

He barged into the Lodge at the end of the New

Year's Eve celebration, while the last number was being played.
[R. 535 A, 538, 553, 596, 924, 926]
20.

Basically correct.

21.

Appellant claims that most members of the Beehive

Lodge of Elks knew Scott.

This is not quite accurate.

Most of the

members knew who Scott was, but most did not know Scott personally
[R. 535]
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22.

Basically correct.

23.

Appellant claims that David Gray had a membership card

on his person at the time of the shooting.
what misleading.

4

This statement is some-

The police found a membership card in his pocket

following the shooting, but the police officer stated that they

|

did not know who the card belonged to or whose name was upon it.
[R. 726-727]
member.

The records of the Lodge show that Gray was not a

[Ex. 30-D]

The testimony of the leaders of the Lodge

indicate he was not a member.

i

[R. 521]

It is respectfully submitted that the Court correctly instructed the jury that the Lodge had no duty to anticipate that this
crime would occur.

*

The Court correctly instructed the jury that

the Lodge had a duty of reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances in behalf of its members and their guests at the New
Year's Eve Ball.

Whether or not the Lodge exercised reasonable

and ordinary care under the circumstances was a question for the
jury, and the jury rendered its verdict.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING THE TESTIMONY OF
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS, WILLIAM GATELY.
Appellant called as an expert witness William Gately.

His

testimony was given by proffer of proof, which was rightfully
refused by the Court for reasons hereinafter given.
Gately testified that he moved to Salt Lake City after the
incident at the Elks Lodge [R. 612, 630] and had been licensed as
a private detective in Utah 1 1/2 years after the New Year's Eve
-32-
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in question.

[R. 612, 630, 631]

He admitted he had never done any

work in private clubs in Salt Lake City.

[R. 614]

He admitted

that his only security experience had been in the large cities of
the West Coast--namely Portland and Los Angeles, [R. 631] and that
he was not familiar with private clubs in Salt Lake City.

[R- 631]

Gately further admitted that his only experience in Portland,
Oregon, and Los Angeles, had been with those private clubs which
"had reputations of problems arising and situations getting out of
hand" [R. 623] and where the patrons were between the ages of 21
and 40.

[R. 623]

(Note that the members of the Beehive Lodge of

Elks had an average age of 54.6 years at the time of this incident,
the oldest being 73 years of age, and out of 71 members, only nine
were under the age of 40.

[Ex. 30-D, Roster of Members])

Gately also admitted that he was not at the Beehive Elks
Lodge on New Year's Eve, nor even in Salt Lake City at that time,
but on the West Coast, and had never before been in Salt Lake City
on New Year's Eve.

[R. 631]

Also, he admitted that he does not

know any member of the Elks Lodge.

[R. 631]

Gately further admitted that he is not familiar with the
private clubs in Salt Lake City, and further admitted that he had
never done any work in any clubs in Salt Lake City.

[R. 614, 631]

Gately claimed that some private clubs had availed themselves of
security services, but he could not name any.

[R. 614]

Gately further admitted that he did not know the name of any
private club presently hiring security guards in Salt Lake City.
[R. 614]
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Gately further admitted that for the few months that he had
been in Salt Lake City, his primary security account had been the
First Security Bank.

[R. 616]

He also admitted that in giving his

opinion, he was not aware that the Elks Lodge had never had, at
an official function, a fight, knifing, or shooting.
that he had thought otherwise.

He stated

[R. 631]

Gately further admitted that his expert testimony was
clearly speculative and that he could not state one way or another
that the shooting would not have occurred had his services been
available.

His testimony was:

[R. 635]

Q Even if there had been security guards there,
there is no way you can say whether or not a
shooting would have occurred, can you?
A

No.

Q In fact Robert Kennedy was shot in a hotel
lobby in Los Angeles surrounded by Secret Service,
the FBI and Los Angeles Police Department, wasn't
he?
A

That's right.

Q And President Ford was shot at in front of a
hotel lined with uniformed policemen up and down
the street surrounded by the Secret Service and
the FBI by a woman across the street; is that right?
A

That1s right.

Q So itfs all speculation, isn't it, as to whether
a shooting would have occurred even if guards had
been there?
A

That's right.

[R. 635]

Gately later claimed that if he had five to six armed
security guards there, the shooting wouldn't have happened.

[R. 636]

Based upon the above testimony of Gately, the Court refused
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plaintiff's proffer of proof for lack of foundation and because
the security arrangements which he described (mace, handcuffs,
nightstick, five uniformed guards, etc.) went beyond the reasonable
and ordinary care required, and further, that it called for a conclusion from him on the very issue that should have gone to the jury.
[R. 637-638]
The Appellant claims that Gately's testimony, at least as
to what was available in security devices, should have been allowed.
However, the Court rightfully refused the same, since the security
devices described went beyond the duty this private lodge owed to
its private members and their guests.

There had been no problems

in the history of the Lodge functions requiring security guards,
mace, handcuffs, or night sticks.

The testimony was that the Lodge

members had always been able to handle the minor arguments that had
occurred in the past.

This was true in regard to the Saturday

night argument between Scott and Gray inside the Lodge, wherein
the manager broke it up and informed the participants to leave,
which they did.

Any trouble between Gray and Scott left the Lodge

and occurred elsewhere.
The fact that mace, guns, nightsticks, or handcuffs were
available is immaterial.

There was no duty on the part of the Elks

Lodge to provide any of these items.

And, the posting of five-

security guards, armed with mace, nightsticks and handcuffs, at the
Elks Lodge party, who would search every person who entered, certainly would go far beyond reasonable and ordinary care, and would
not be expected of the leadership of this Lodge.
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Appellant further claims that since Sylvester Jones, a
member of the Lodge who was present at the time of the shooting
and sitting near the participants of the shooting, was allowed to
testify, that Gately should have also been allowed to testifyHowever, Sylvester Jones was not testifying as a security guard,
but was testifying as an eye witness, present at the time of the
shooting in question.

Furthermore, Appellant never objected to

Sylvester Jones1 testimony in regard to what he could and could not
have done during the shooting.
Gately's testimony was mere speculation, by his own admission.
Whether or not mace, guns, nightsticks, or handcuffs were available,
or armed guards or uniformed guards had been present, and whether
such could have prevented any shooting, is all pure speculation.
All of the same devices, as well as uniformed police, the Secret
Service, the the FBI, did not prevent the shooting of Robert
Kennedy in Los Angeles, or the attempted shooting of President Ford
in Sacramento, California.
The Court rightfully excluded the testimony of William Gately.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE OFFICER JAMES BURNS.
Officer Burns testified that he was a vice officer employed
by the Salt Lake City Police Department, and had been employed as a
policeman for eight years.

[R. 934]

He testified that he was

familiar with the customs and practices of the private clubs and
private lodges in Salt Lake City.
-36-

[R. 935]
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He further testified that he had been in all of the private
clubs and lodges in the Salt Lake City area and knew the customs
and practices of the lodges and clubs as to security.

[R. 935]

He

stated that he knew the customs and practices from his own experience
and observations.

[R. 935]

He also testified that his official duties included the contacting of the management of the private lodges and clubs and being
familiar with their operation.

[R. 936]

He further testified that

he was not aware of any instance where a private club or lodge
hired a security guard.

[R. 938]

He further testified, by questions put to him by the Appellant,
that it was a common practice for bartenders to handle such situations
that might arise, and that in the case of fights, it was common
practice for the bartender to call the police.

[R. 939]

The Utah Rules of Evidence provide the following:
Rule 49. HABIT OR CUSTOM TO PROVE SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR.
Evidence of habit or custom is relevant to an
issue of behavior on a specified occasion, but is
admissible on that issue only as tending to prove
that the behavior on such occasion conformed to the
habit or custom.
Rule 50. OPINION AND SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF BEHAVIOR
TO PROVE HABIT OR CUSTOM.
Testimony in the form of opinion is admissible
on the issue of habit or custom. Evidence of specific
instances of behavior is admissible to prove habit
or custom if the evidence is of a sufficient number
of such instances to warrant a finding of such
habit or custom.
Rule 56. TESTIMONY IN FORM OF OPINION.
(1) If the witness is not testifying as an expert
his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences
is limited to such opinions or inferences as the
judge finds (a) may be rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear
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understanding of his testimony or to the determination of the fact in issue.
(2) If the witness is testifying as an expert,
testimony of the witness in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to such opinions as the
judge finds are (a) based on facts or data perceived by
or personally known or made known to the witness at
the hearing and (b) within the scope of the special
knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed
by the witness,
(3) Unless the judge excludes the testimony he
shall be deemed to have made the finding requisite
to its admission.
C4^ * * * *
Officer Burns gave testimony as to custom and practice, as
allowed by the Utah Rules of Evidence.

His knowledge was based

upon his own personal observations and experience and familiarity
with each and every private lodge or club in Salt Lake City.
50, cited above, allows such testimony where the

Rule

ff

evidence is of a

sufficient number of such instances to warrant a finding of such
habit or custom."

How could there be better evidence of custom

and practice than the testimony of the police officer whose very
duty was to deal with such private clubs and lodges, and who
expressly stated he was personally familiar with the customs and
practices of such lodges and clubs in regard to security measures.
Appellant claims that Respondent did not offer Burns1 testimony
as that of an expert.

This is incorrect.

Respondent stated that

Officer Burns' expert testimony was offered as to custom and practice.
[R. 686, 687]

He did not, however, testify as an expert beyond that.

As for the plaintiff's expert, William Gately, he could not
give such testimony because he admitted he was a stranger to Salt
Lake City, that he had no experience with the private clubs in Salt
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Lake City, that his only experience had been with three private
clubs in Portland, which had reputations for "getting out of hand"
and which catered to young persons between the ages of 20 and 40.
Furthermore, he could not name any lodges or clubs in Salt Lake
City which utilized security guards.

Such testimony could not

possibly establish the customs and practices of private clubs and
lodges in the Salt Lake Valley.
The Appellant argues that since Officer Burns was allowed
to testify, that William Gately should have been allowed to testify.
However, that proposition does not legally nor logically follow.
Each witness must qualify to testify.

There was no foundation laid

for the testimony of Gately in this case, hence his testimony was
rightfully excluded.
The Appellant further argues that the Court did not give a
cautionary instruction in regard to Officer Burns1 testimony.
However, the Appellant never requested such an instruction, nor
did the Appellant, at any time, object that such an instruction was
not given.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51, provide:
. . . No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless he
objects thereto . . .
In McGinn v. Utah Power § Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 1974)
where one party failed to object to the failure of the trial court
to give a certain instruction, the Utah Supreme Court held that
such failure to object results in a waiver.

The Court stated:

Besides, plaintiff's failure to object to the
court's not giving the instruction mentioned
-39-
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in 2) above was a waiver thereof under Rule 51,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The said Utah rule and the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation
of the same are consistent with the rule of law in the surrounding
states.

See Nelson v. C § C Plywood Corp., 465 P.2d 314 (Mont. 1970);

Bohlender v. Oster, 439 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1968); City of Scottsdale v.
Kokaska, 17 Ariz. App. 120, 495 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. 1972); Frame v.
Grisewood, 399 P.2d 450 (Nev. 1965); Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad
Co. v. French, 368 P.2d 652 (Okl. 1962); Fulton Insurance Co. v.
White Motor Corp., 493 P.2d 138 (Ore. 1972); O'Brien v. Artz, 445
P.2d 632 (Wash. 1968); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d
963 (Wyo. 1973).
In any case, the Trial Court's Instruction No. 2 informed
the jury that they were the exclusive judges of the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and that they, the
jury, had the right to judge the weight of the testimony and the
credibility of the witnesses and the reasonableness of their statements
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of James
Burns was admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence.
POINT IV.
APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN REFUSING TO ASK CERTAIN QUESTIONS REQUESTED OF PROSPECTIVE
JURORS ON VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION IS NOT WELL TAKEN.
Appellant claims the Trial Judge committed prejudicial error
in refusing to ask certain questions of prospective jurors during
voir dire examination as requested by the plaintiff.

However,

the Appellant did not designate in his Designation of Record on
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Appeal that portion of the transcript covering the selection of
the jury.

It would be impossible to consider such question in

this appeal.
The Appellant apparently bases his objection upon a written
word "No" which appears in the margin of Appellant's original
voir dire request filed with the Court.

There are no initials

appearing by the word "No" and it is unknown who wrote such word
upon the said request.
Furthermore, it is Respondent's recollection that the Trial
Court very fairly and thoroughly inquired of the jury as to all
proper matters which enlightened all parties in order that any
challenges could be made.

It is also the Respondent's recollection

that the Trial Court did inquire generally in the areas complained
of by the Appellant.
In the case cited by the Appellant, Kiernan v. Vanschaik,
347 F.2d 775 (1965), the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
stated:
The federal rules, which are substantially
identical in civil and criminal cases, leave it
to the discretion of the court whether the voir
dire shall be entrusted to counsel or conducted
by the court, and provide that in the latter
event the court must permit such supplementary
examination by counsel as it deems proper or
shall itself submit such additional questions
to the prospective jurors. Here in the manner
in which the voir dire is conducted, the widest
discretion necessarily is reposed in the trial
judge.
In our case, the questions may or may not have been put
forth exactly in the wording requested by the Appellant, but it
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is this Respondent's recollection that such questions were substantially given by the general inquiry made by the Court of the
jury panel.
The other case cited by Appellant, Crawford v. Manning,
524 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975) has no application here.

In that case,

the Trial Judge made a statement to the jury panel whereupon one
of the jurymen indicated that she had strong feelings regarding the
matter, the Trial Judge refused to excuse her for cause, and was
reversed by the Supreme Court.

That case has no applicability here.

Furthermore, the Appellant never objected at any time in
regard to the manner in which the jury was selected.
In any case, the Appellant has not shown any prejudice in
the manner in which the jury panel was chosen.
It is submitted that this issue, raised by the Appellant
at this time for the first time, is not well taken.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 18, 32, 33, 34, 35, AND 36, OR BY REFUSING TO
GIVE PLAINTIFF1S REQUESTS NO. 14, 15, 23, AND 26.
Appellant claims the Trial Court committed prejudicial
error in giving its Instructions No. 18, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36.
However, a review of those instructions indicates otherwise.
Court Instruction No. 18 dealt with the question of damages,
and since the jury did not reach the question of damages as to
Respondent, that instruction is immaterial to this appeal.
Court Instruction No. 32 is a correct statement of the law.
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The claims of the plaintiffs are dependent upon the acts of the
deceased and any defenses thereto.
Court Instruction No. 33 had application only to defendant
Galveston Sonny Scott and not to the Respondent.

Therefore, that

instruction is immaterial in this appeal.
Court Instruction No. 34 is a correct statement of the law.
The reasonable, prudent man is judged not by hindsight, but by
foresight.
Court Instruction No. 35 is a correct statement of the law.
One person who performs duties under the law has a right to assume
that other persons will also perform their duties, unless warned
to the contrary.
Court Instruction No. 36 has already been discussed at
length in Point I of both Briefs.
Appellant further argues that the Court committed prejudicial
error in failing to give Requested Instructions No. 14, 15, 23, and
26.

However, a review of those instructions indicates otherwise.
The Plaintiff1s Requested Instruction No. 14 was essentially

given by the Court in other instruction.

Defendant's duty was to

be reasonably diligent and to exercise such watchfulness and caution
as circumstances required.

Court Instruction No. 10 covered this.

Furthermore, the said requested instruction, as drafted, contained
words concerning the duties of those doing dangerous acts.
is no evidence that the Respondents did any dangerous acts.
instruction would have been improper.
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There
Such

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 15 was given in
substance by the Trial Court's Instructions No. 10, No. 15, No. 34,
and No. 35.

Furthermore, the said instruction requested by the

plaintiff to the effect that "a person is liable for all of the
natural and probable consequences of his actM is incorrect.

A

person is liable only for his acts which are negligent, and then
only if the proximate cause of an accident.

It would have been

prejudicial error to give this instruction.
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 23 was given in
substance.

Court Instruction No. 30 stated that although the

Lodge was a non-profit, charitable, and benevolent association,
it could still be held liable for its negligent acts, like any other
private person or corporation.

Furthermore, Court Instruction

No. 17 stated the Lodge to be responsible for the acts or omissions
of its officers, trustees, and members of the New Year's Eve
committee.
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 26 was given by the
Court in its Instructions No. 10, No 15, and No. 34.
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant's claim
that the Court committed prejudicial error in regard to the instructions as stated above is not well taken.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court did not
commit any prejudicial error as claimed by the Appellant, but
that the testimony was fairly and rightfully admitted into or
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excluded from evidence, and that the jury was properly
instructed by the Court, and that after due deliberation, the
jury returned a just unanimous verdict, which should be affirmed,

2

£&-

_ day of June, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, WADSWORTH § RUSSON

l. RUSSDN
Attorneys for Defendant^Respondent
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of
the foregoing Respondent's Brief to James A. Mcintosh, James
A. Mcintosh § Associates, Attorneys for Appellant, 525 South
300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and to Ron Eubanks,
Attorney for Defendant, Galveston Sonny Scott, 250 East Third
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

7^

day of June, 1976.
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